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Overview—Despite the good intentions prior to and in
the aftermath of September’s atrocities, the existence of
significant gaps in the country’s emergency prepared-
ness is clear. Further, the lack of coordination and
seamless integration between public health, public
safety, law enforcement, and the media has been
highlighted by the events of the past few weeks. This
background paper will provide an overview of the
current state of emergency preparedness at all levels of
government, by identifying both the gaps and the steps
being taken to close them. A series of reference materi-
als, including a suggested reading list and Web site
addresses, are listed at the end of the paper.
Bioterrorism is, of course, not new. Preparing for it on
a grand scale in the United States, however, is. But the
country is not starting from scratch. Over the years,
experts have been calling for a more robust public health
infrastructure, for a closer working relationship between
the medical and public health communities, and for a
broader research and development agenda in this area.
Preparing for such an attack has taken on great urgency
since September 11. Priorities have shifted, and the
importance of the public health and safety infrastructure
has become clearer than ever before.
DISTINGUISHING BIOTERRORISM
FROM OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
The intentional release, or threat of a release, of
biological agents (that is viruses, bacteria, or their
toxins) in order to terrorize a civilian population or
manipulate a government is commonly referred to as
bioterrorism or “the poor man’s nuclear bomb.” Al-
though similar in its ability to cause devastating medical
consequences as well as widespread panic and disrup-
tion, bioterrorism is very different from chemical
terrorism (such as the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo Sarin gas
attack in the Tokyo subway).
A chemical attack would be instantly obvious,
whereas a biologic attack would take days, if not weeks,
to become apparent. A chemical attack would rely on
traditional first responders, such as fire, police, hazard-
ous materials (HAZMAT) teams, and emergency
medical technicians whereas first responders in a
bioterror attack would be primarily epidemiologists,
infectious disease specialists, emergency room person-
nel, and public health officials. In all cases, local
medical personnel would also play a vital role.
In the case of a bioterrorist attack, a variety of
biologic agents potentially could be used. But different
government agencies have compiled different threat
lists. Federal Bureau of Investigation intelligence
officers have one list of likely threat agents, while the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
have another. But as the September 2001 General
Accounting Office (GAO) report Bioterrorism: Federal
Research and Preparedness Activities points out,
“different threat lists are appropriate because of the
different focuses of these agencies.” The report notes,
for example, that while one list focuses on agents that
would have the greatest impact on public health, others
specify which agents may be more likely to be used by
a terrorist group operating inside the United States, a
terrorist group that is not foreign-sponsored. Despite the
differences, most experts list anthrax, pneumonic
plague, and botulism toxin as highly credible threats.
Some lists also include smallpox, salmonellosis, tulare-
mia, and West Nile virus, as well as others. (See Ap-
pendix I for more information on some of these agents.)
The distinction between bioterrorism and chemical
terrorism, as well as that between radiologic and
nuclear terrorism, is critical, for in the differences
between them lie unique requirements for preparedness.
While many of the issues and challenges are the same,
regardless of the type of terror attack (for example, the
ability of the health care system to deal with mass
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casualties and the “worried well,” short and long-term
mental health needs, and panic), the nature of an attack
will determine the response and ultimately the level of
preparedness. In the end, however, while the initial
responses may start out differently, all emergency




Bioterror agents can be released into the environ-
ment, the food supply, the water supply, or in some
cases passed directly from one person to another. With
the very recent establishment of an Office of Homeland
Security (an office which has no statutory or budget
authority at this point), President Bush has signaled the
importance of coordinated, centralized oversight of the
safety of food, water, air, and personal health as well as
national security. In fact, however, this responsibility is
still divided among many government agencies and
congressional committees—agencies and committees
that, to some extent, compete for dollars and turf.
According to some experts, while many critical pro-
grams have been effective, the lack of a unified strategy
has resulted in a fractured system in which duplication
of effort and inefficiencies abound.
In her October 5 testimony before the House Gov-
ernment Reform/Government Efficiency, Financial
Management, and Intergovernmental Relations Sub-
committee, Janet Heinrich, director, health care, for
public health issues at GAO, summarized findings from
the September 2001 GAO bioterrorism report. Heinrich
testified that “over 40 federal departments and agencies
have some role in combating terrorism, and coordinat-
ing their activities is a significant challenge.”
Of the 40 departments, the Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS) plays a major role.
Appendix II, taken from the September 2001 GAO
bioterrorism report, lists all the activities of the various
agencies within DHHS working on bioterrorism and
emergency preparedness issues.
In addition to the vast efforts under way within
DHHS, many other federal departments and agen-
cies—the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Justice,
Commerce, Energy, Defense, Agriculture, Transporta-
tion, and Treasury and the Environmental Protection
and Federal Emergency Management Agencies—are
also devoting significant resources to preparing for and
preventing bioterrorism. In the nation’s zeal to ramp up
its counter-terrorism armamentarium, a significant
amount of money has been earmarked for bioterror
preparedness. Many caution, however, that dollars
alone will not be enough.
Experts stress that it is not so much new programs
that are needed, but rather a more coordinated approach
that improves and augments current programs as our
capabilities are honed. These programs, some of which
are more developed than others, include but are not
limited to the following:
 National Laboratory System—a demonstration pro-
gram funded by the CDC in response to the growing
public health threat posed by bioterrorism, food-borne
diseases, and emerging infectious diseases.
 Laboratory Response Network—a national network
composed of county, city, state, and federal public
health laboratories.
 Health Alert Network—a nationwide program,
developed by the CDC in partnership with the
National Association of County and City Health
Officials, the Association of State and Territorial
Health Officials, and other health organizations, to
establish the communications, information, distance-
learning, and organizational infrastructure that will
link local health departments to one another and to
other relevant organizations.
 National Pharmaceutical Stockpile—a resource
consisting of pharmaceutical, medical, surgical, and
patient support supplies, as well as a cache of
available vaccines, items that local physicians and
health facilities might find in short supply in the
event of a terrorist attack or other significant health
incident.
 National Disaster Medical System—a partnership
that brings together DHHS, the Department of
Defense, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, and the Department of Veterans Affairs in
order to provide medical response, patient evacua-
tion, and medical care for mass casualty events.
Many other programs and teams are in place and
ready to deploy should the need arise. The CDC would
be available to assist state and local governments in their
disease surveillance, identification, and control efforts,
while the DHHS Office of Emergency Preparedness
would be ready to assist state and local authorities in
providing care for massive numbers of casualties.
While preparedness plans are under way at the
federal level, health officials in the states and localities
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are working to bring their facilities up to where they
need to be. But preparedness gaps that still exist at the
state and local levels have become a focal point of
significant concern for congressional and state leaders.
Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Robert
Byrd (D-W.Va.) echoed this sentiment when he de-
clared during an October 3 Subcommittee on Labor,
Health and Human Services, and Education (La-
bor/HHS) hearing that “there is no more important job
facing us as appropriators and authorizers than address-
ing perceived preparedness gaps in state and local
emergency response systems.”
Some of the most serious preparedness gaps exist
within the public health infrastructure, considered by
many to be the backbone of bioterrorism preparedness.
Others, however, insist that what currently exists is not
really a public health infrastructure, but rather an
amalgam of agencies across the country that carry out
the disparate functions known as public health.
SHORING UP THE PUBLIC HEALTH
INFRASTRUCTURE
DHHS Secretary Tommy Thompson underscored
the importance of public health when he declared at the
October 3 congressional hearing that “public health is
a national security issue.” However, shoring up the
public health infrastructure, which had been woefully
underfunded and underappreciated before September
11, will require a commitment of resources—including
the costs of hiring personnel, training staff, enhancing
laboratories, and improving secure and reliable commu-
nication and data management systems. Analysts note
that these resources must be viewed in the context of
overall health spending, overall defense spending, and
overall emergency preparedness spending—in short, a
recalibration of the nation’s priorities.
In an address over the Public Health Training
Network, broadcast in mid-September 2001, CDC
Director Jeffrey Koplan, M.D., identified seven priority
areas for capacity building at the state and local levels.
Patricia Quinlisk, M.D., medical director and state
epidemiologist, Iowa Department of Public Health,
summarized these priority areas in testimony before the
October 3 Senate Labor/HHS Subcommittee hearing:
 A public health workforce that is well-trained, well-
staffed, and fully prepared.
 Laboratory capacity to produce timely and accurate
results for diagnosis and investigation.

Epidemiology and surveillance to rapidly detect
health threats.
 Information systems that are accessible and rapid
and that permit effective analyses and interpretation
of health data and provide public access to health
information.
 Communication systems that enable a rapid, secure,
two-way flow of information that includes the ability
to provide timely, accurate information to the public
and to advise health officials and policymakers in
public health emergencies.
 Policy and evaluation that provides for routine
assessment of how effective experts are at rapidly
detecting health threats and making improvements.
 Preparedness and response mechanisms that
develop plans and regularly test them in order to
maintain a high level of preparedness.
Quinlisk explained that last year’s enactment of the
Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act (PHTEA)
provided a process for accomplishing the seven priori-
ties articulated by Koplan. She testified that, very soon,
CDC will publish a document which identifies the core
capacities needed by state and local health departments
for terrorism preparedness and response. The next step,
she said, would be the provision of CDC grants to states
to help them assess themselves against these core
capacities. However, she continued, although assess-
ment tools have been developed for this purpose, “there
are no federal resources for conducting this assessment
of bioterrorism capacity.” The final step authorized
under PHTEA is for CDC to provide grants to states
and local health departments to fill any gaps they have
identified in their assessment process.
Quinlisk then provided several specific examples of
what constitutes core epidemiologic capacity in state
health departments. The items she discussed included
the ability and the authority to:
 Collect personal information.
 Disseminate notifiable disease information and
reporting.
 Establish systematic data collection protocols that
monitor community health indicators (for example,
aberrations in utilization trends or syndrome-based
presentations).
 Educate health care providers on the medical effects
and public health consequences of diseases caused
by bioterrorism agents.
5 
 Train public health, infection control, and clinical
staff to collect and rapidly analyze surveillance data.
CROSSCUTTING PREPAREDNESS
ISSUES
Many of the objectives inherent in bioterrorism
preparedness apply to emergency preparedness and
public health, broadly defined. Indeed, Jonathan B.
Tucker, Ph.D., director of the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Nonproliferation Project at the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of Interna-
tional Studies, testified at the October 3 Senate La-
bor/HHS Subcommittee hearing that “it is important to
note that bioterorrism and the growing challenge of
natural emerging infections are two sides of the same
coin.” Efforts to bolster bioterrorism preparedness,
therefore, should ultimately yield improvements through-
out the entire health care system. Investments in prepared-
ness, much like previous prevention investments, could
result in a “dual use,” that is, delivering a multitude of
returns on the initial investment. For example, if some
drug-resistant bacteria were to emerge, independent of
any terrorist activity, the capabilities developed to combat
bioterrorism would be invaluable.
Similarly, public health and safety issues that were
the subject of previous congressional agendas have
again become the focus of hearings, but with a twist.
The heightened concern over terrorism has sparked
members of Congress to think differently about pro-
grams and areas of responsibility. In just the past few
weeks since the September 11 attacks, for example,
food safety, which was of some interest to the federal
government before September, has become an item of
paramount importance. Legislation has been introduced
to create a single food safety entity, a move aimed at
filling the numerous holes in the nation’s food monitor-
ing systems, responsibilities that currently are split
between the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and
the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Among the many challenges facing officials at all
levels of government and the private sector, two pro-
foundly critical issues have emerged and captured the
attention of health care professionals—(a) the adequacy
of mental health services, both short- and long-term and
(b) the recognition of the unique effects (including
medical, psychological, and social effects) that
bioterrorism and the threat of bioterrorism would have
on children. Sens. Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.)
and Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) and Rep. Louise
Slaughter (D-N.Y.) introduced legislation on October
11 that would create a national task force to make sure
the special health needs of children are taken into
account in responding to the threat of terrorism. Issues
that would be addressed include, for example, the
devastating psychological affects of bioterrorism and
the proper dosing of medications and vaccines specifi-
cally for children.
In addition, a host of thorny legal issues have
emerged that will have to be addressed as the nation
continues to prepare for possible bioterrorist attacks.
LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES
In his recent article, “The Malevolent Use of Mi-
crobes and the Rule of Law: Legal Challenges Pre-
sented by Bioterrorism,” published in the September 1,
2001, issue of Clinical Infectious Diseases, David P.
Fidler, professor of law, Indiana University School of
Law, points out that “What is often neglected in think-
ing about the threats bioweapons pose to public health
is the foundation that law provides for effective public
health activities.” Among the host of legal concerns that
could be triggered by a bioweapons event, according to
Fidler, are “the liability of overrun hospitals and health
care professionals operating in an emergency environ-
ment, the liability of drug and vaccine manufacturers,
and the inevitability of lawsuits after the crisis” in
addition to the concern that “an epidemic may require
violation of individual rights through such acts as
forced quarantine or isolation, compulsory treatment or
vaccination, and seizure and destruction of property.”
Two additional legal questions have been raised.
The first concerns the question of who would be in
charge during a bioterror attack. This has, during
simulations and planning exercises, resulted in much
confusion among experts. The second issue raised by
preparedness officials involves the recently legislated
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) regulations governing the confidentiality of
patient information. Experts are concerned that, should
an attack occur and an epidemic ensue, HIPAA regula-
tions could complicate the vital need to share private
health information quickly and broadly.
Vaccines and Medicines
Vaccine development and use in bioterror-related
events have called into question several legal and
regulatory issues and will continue to do so. Because
vaccines are difficult to develop, are a challenge to
manufacture, have traditionally low profit margins, and
have been the subject of a number of liability suits,
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most drug makers have not heavily invested research
and development dollars in them. Carl Feldman, presi-
dent of the Biotech Industry Organization, was quoted
in a recent USA Today article by Julie Appleby as
saying that “The simple, sad fact is that vaccine devel-
opment hasn’t been a national or medical priority.” In
light of the tremendous pressure to be prepared, phar-
maceutical and biotech companies are reassessing their
product portfolios.
This renewed interest in vaccines, as well as drug
and biotech products that could be used to treat
bioterror-related diseases, have brought the issues of
fast track approval into sharper focus. The FDA’s
antibioterrorism priorities now include making final the
1999 proposed rule entitled “Evidence Needed to
Demonstrate Efficacy of New Drugs for Use against
Lethal or Permanently Disabling Toxic Substances
When Efficacy Studies in Humans Ethically Cannot Be
Conducted,” assisting CDC in storing and tracking the
antibioterrorism pharmaceutical stockpile, and running
an animal model working group to test potential
antibioterrorism agents in animals.
Calling into question the ability of the private sector
to mass-produce vaccines that could be used against
biological agents, some members of Congress, such as
Rep. Richard Burr (R-N.C.), are considering the estab-
lishment of a federal program for vaccine manufactur-
ing. Other options for improving the rapid availability
of vaccines and medicines include public-private
partnerships, partnerships with other countries (such as
the one the United States now has with the United
Kingdom), and partnerships with Defense Department
research facilities.
It is clear that further legal analyses of all these
complex issues are not only warranted but also a
necessary component of preparedness.
I-1
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This material has been developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  Reuse or reproduction of this 
material is authorized.  Information updated September 2001. 
Facts about Anthrax 
 
Anthrax is an acute infectious disease caused by the spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis. 
Anthrax most commonly occurs in hoofed mammals and can also infect humans.  
 
Symptoms of disease vary depending on how the disease was contracted, but usually occur 
within 7 days after exposure. The serious forms of human anthrax are inhalation anthrax, 
cutaneous anthrax, and intestinal anthrax.  
 
Initial symptoms of inhalation anthrax infection may resemble a common cold. After several 
days, the symptoms may progress to severe breathing problems and shock. Inhalation anthrax is 
often fatal.  
 
The intestinal disease form of anthrax may follow the consumption of contaminated food and is 
characterized by an acute inflammation of the intestinal tract. Initial signs of nausea, loss of 
appetite, vomiting, and fever are followed by abdominal pain, vomiting of blood, and severe 
diarrhea. 
 
Direct person-to-person spread of anthrax is extremely unlikely, if it occurs at all. Therefore, 
there is no need to immunize or treat contacts of persons ill with anthrax, such as household 
contacts, friends, or coworkers, unless they also were also exposed to the same source of 
infection. 
 
In persons exposed to anthrax, infection can be prevented with antibiotic treatment.  
 
Early antibiotic treatment of anthrax is essential–delay lessens chances for survival. Anthrax 
usually is susceptible to penicillin, doxycycline, and fluoroquinolones.  
 
An anthrax vaccine also can prevent infection. Vaccination against anthrax is not recommended 








This material has been developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  Reuse or reproduction of this 
material is authorized.  Information updated September 2001. 
Facts about Botulism  
 
Botulism is a muscle-paralyzing disease caused by a toxin made by a bacterium called 
Clostridium botulinum. 
 
There are three main kinds of botulism: 
 
· Foodborne botulism occurs when a person ingests pre-formed toxin that leads to illness 
within a few hours to days. Foodborne botulism is a public health emergency because the 
contaminated food may still be available to other persons besides the patient. 
 
· Infant botulism occurs in a small number of susceptible infants each year who harbor C. 
botulinum in their intestinal tract. 
 
· Wound botulism occurs when wounds are infected with C. botulinum that secretes the 
toxin. 
 
With foodborne botulism, symptoms begin within 6 hours to 2 weeks (most commonly between 
12 and 36 hours) after eating toxin-containing food. Symptoms of botulism include double 
vision, blurred vision, drooping eyelids, slurred speech, difficulty swallowing, dry mouth, 
muscle weakness that always descends through the body: first shoulders are affected, then upper 
arms, lower arms, thighs, calves, etc. Paralysis of breathing muscles can cause a person to stop 
breathing and die, unless assistance with breathing (mechanical ventilation) is provided. 
 
Botulism is not spread from one person to another. Foodborne botulism can occur in all age 
groups. 
 
A supply of antitoxin against botulism is maintained by CDC.  The antitoxin is effective in 
reducing the severity of symptoms if administered early in the course of the disease. Most 
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material is authorized.  Information updated September 2001. 
 
Facts about Pneumonic Plague 
 
Plague is an infectious disease of animals and humans caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis. 
Y. pestis, is found in rodents and their fleas in many areas around the world.  
 
Pneumonic plague occurs when Y. pestis infects the lungs.  The first signs of illness in 
pneumonic plague are fever, headache, weakness, and cough productive of bloody or watery 
sputum. The pneumonia progresses over 2 to 4 days and may cause septic shock and, without 
early treatment, death. 
 
Person-to-person transmission of pneumonic plague occurs through respiratory droplets, which 
can only infect those who have face-to-face contact with the ill patient. 
 
Early treatment of pneumonic plague is essential. Several antibiotics are effective, including 
streptomycin, tetracycline, and chloramphenicol.  
 
There is no vaccine against plague.  
 
Prophylactic antibiotic treatment for 7 days will protect persons who have had face-to-face 
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Facts about Smallpox 
 
Smallpox infection was eliminated from the world in 1977. 
 
Smallpox is caused by variola virus.  The incubation period is about 12 days (range: 7 to 17 
days) following exposure. Initial symptoms include high fever, fatigue, and head and back aches. 
A characteristic rash, most prominent on the face, arms, and legs, follows in 2-3 days. The rash 
starts with flat red lesions that evolve at the same rate. Lesions become pus-filled and begin to 
crust early in the second week. Scabs develop and then separate and fall off after about 3-4 
weeks.  The majority of patients with smallpox recover, but death occurs in up to 30% of cases.  
 
Smallpox is spread from one person to another by infected saliva droplets that expose a 
susceptible person having face-to-face contact with the ill person. Persons with smallpox are 
most infectious during the first week of illness, because that is when the largest amount of virus 
is present in saliva. However, some risk of transmission lasts until all scabs have fallen off. 
 
Routine vaccination against smallpox ended in 1972. The level of immunity, if any, among 
persons who were vaccinated before 1972 is uncertain; therefore, these persons are assumed to 
be susceptible. 
 
Vaccination against smallpox is not recommended to prevent the disease in the general public 
and therefore is not available.  
 
In people exposed to smallpox, the vaccine can lessen the severity of or even prevent illness 
if given within 4 days after exposure. Vaccine against smallpox contains another live virus 
called vaccinia. The vaccine does not contain smallpox virus.  
 
The United States currently has an emergency supply of smallpox vaccine. 
 
There is no proven treatment for smallpox but research to evaluate new antiviral agents is 
ongoing. Patients with smallpox can benefit from supportive therapy (intravenous fluids, 





Department of Health and Human Services
Bioterrorism Preparedness Activities
Excerpted from 
U.S. General Accounting Office, “Department of Health and Human Services,” Appendix VIII, in
Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities, GAO Report (GAO-01-915),
September 2001, 48-66.
Appendix VIIIDepartment of Health and Human Services Apendix VIWithin HHS, five agencies or offices work on bioterrorism issues. The 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and NIH are primarily involved in research 
activities, and CDC and OEP are primarily concerned with preparedness 
activities. HHS is the primary federal agency for the medical and public 
health response to emergencies, including major disasters and terrorist 
events, under the Federal Response Plan. In addition, the Secretary of HHS 
has recently appointed a Special Assistant for Bioterrorism to coordinate 
antibioterrorism efforts across the department.
The Secretary of HHS was authorized $221 million in fiscal year 2001 
through the Public Health Improvement Act of 2000 for the medical and 
public health consequences of a bioterrorist attack. However, despite this 
authorization, there were no specific appropriations for such activities.
Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality
AHRQ’s mission is to support research designed to improve the outcomes 
and quality of health care, reduce its costs, address safety and medical 
errors, and broaden access to effective services. Working through an 
informal interagency workgroup, AHRQ included officials across HHS 
(such as those in CDC, OEP, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation) in its anti-bioterrorism research planning efforts. 
Research Activities AHRQ received $5 million in fiscal year 2000 to develop research initiatives 
to identify effective and specific strategies for improving the clinical 
preparedness of health care providers and health care systems for a 
bioterrorist attack. For example, the agency funded research on the use of 
information systems and decision support systems to enhance 
preparedness for the delivery of medical care in the event of such an 
attack. AHRQ, along with other HHS agency partners, also provided 
funding to support a bioterrorism symposium sponsored by the Center for 
Civilian Biodefense Studies at Johns Hopkins University.
Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention
HHS was designated to lead an effort to work with governmental and 
nongovernmental partners to upgrade the nation’s capacity to respond to 
bioterrorism.  Several centers, institutes, and offices within CDC work 
together on bioterrorism preparedness and response efforts. The principal 
priority of the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program is to 
upgrade infrastructure and capacity to respond to a large-scale epidemic, Page 48 GAO-01-915 Bioterrorism:  Federal Research and Preparedness Activities
Appendix VIII
Department of Health and Human Servicesregardless of whether it is the result of a bioterrorist attack or a naturally 
occurring infectious disease outbreak. The program was started in fiscal 
year 1999 and was tasked with building and enhancing national, state, and 
local capacity; developing a national pharmaceutical stockpile; and 
conducting several independent studies on bioterrorism. It has focused on 
helping states with planning for a bioterrorist event; enhancing surveillance 
and laboratory capacity at the national, state, and local levels; and 
improving communications and training for bioterrorism preparedness. 
Examples of CDC’s internal research activities include work on anthrax 
and smallpox. The agency also oversees a number of studies being 
conducted by universities and hospitals. Table 7 lists CDC’s reported 
bioterrorism funding for fiscal years 1998 through 2001.Page 49 GAO-01-915 Bioterrorism:  Federal Research and Preparedness Activities
Appendix VIII
Department of Health and Human ServicesTable 7:  Reported Funding for Activities on Bioterrorism at CDC (Dollars in millions)
Note: We have not audited or otherwise verified the information provided.
aCDC received funding in fiscal year 1999, fiscal year 2000, and fiscal year 2001 for bioterrorism 
deterrence activities, such as implementing regulations restricting the importation of certain biological 
agents. However, since deterrence is outside the scope of our study, that funding is not included here.
bFor instance, $1 million was specified in the fiscal year 2000 appropriations conference report for the 
Carnegie Mellon Research Institute to study health and bioterrorism threats.
Source: CDC.
The Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program was placed within 
the National Center for Infectious Diseases because of the likely similarity 
between a bioterrorist attack and a naturally occurring infectious disease 
outbreak. The National Center for Infectious Diseases oversees research, 
surveillance, laboratory, and epidemiological response efforts. The 
National Center for Environmental Health manages the National 
Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program and associated emergency 
preparedness and planning activities. Several other offices and institutes 
also contribute to the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program, 
including the Epidemiology Program Office; the Public Health Practice 
Program Office, which focuses on communications and training; and the 











   Research and development 0 0 $40.5 $42.9
   Independent studiesb 0 $1.8 $7.7 $2.6
   Worker safety 0 0 0 $1.1
Preparedness activities
   Upgrading state and local capacity 0 $55.0 $56.9 $66.7
      Preparedness planning 0 $2.0 $1.9 $5.8
      Surveillance and epidemiology 0 $12.0 $15.8 $16.1
      Laboratory capacity 0 $13.0 $9.5 $12.8
      Communications 0 $28.0 $29.7 $32.0
   Upgrading CDC capacity 0 $12.0 $13.9 $20.4
      Epidemiologic capacity 0 $2.0 $1.8 $4.0
      Laboratory capacity 0 $5.0 $7.6 $11.4
      Rapid toxic screen 0 $5.0 $4.5 $5.0
   Preparedness and response planning 0 $1.0 $2.3 $9.2
   Building the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile 0 $51.0 $51.8 $51.0
Total 0 $120.8 $173.1 $193.9Page 50 GAO-01-915 Bioterrorism:  Federal Research and Preparedness Activities
Appendix VIII
Department of Health and Human Servicesresponsible for coordination within CDC and with other federal agencies 
and for policy development.
Research Activities In fiscal year 2001, CDC was allocated $18 million to continue research on 
an anthrax vaccine and associated issues, such as scheduling and dosage. 
The agency also received $22.4 million in fiscal year 2001 to conduct 
smallpox research. In addition, CDC oversees a number of independent 
studies, which are specific lines in the budget that fund specific universities 
and hospitals to do research and other work on bioterrorism. For example, 
the Carnegie Mellon Research Institute received $1 million in fiscal year 
2000 to study health and bioterrorism threats. Finally, CDC’s National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health is developing standards for 
respiratory protection equipment used against biological agents by 
firefighters, laboratory technicians, and other potentially affected workers.
Preparedness Activities Most of CDC’s activities to counter bioterrorism are focused on building 
and expanding multipurpose public health infrastructure at the national, 
state, and local levels. For example, CDC reported receiving funding of 
$66.7 million in fiscal year 2001 to upgrade state and local capacity to 
detect and respond to a bioterrorist attack. CDC received an additional 
$20.4 million to upgrade its own capacity in these areas, $9.2 million for 
planning and response, and another $51 million for developing the National 
Pharmaceutical Stockpile. These activities may have a dual use, such as 
identifying and containing a naturally occurring emerging infectious 
disease in addition to responding to a bioterrorism attack. 
Upgrading State and Local 
Capacity
In fiscal year 2000, CDC received $56.9 million to award to 50 states and 4 
major metropolitan health departments for preparedness and response 
activities. CDC also provides technical assistance to these agencies to 
assist preparedness efforts. CDC is developing planning guidance for state 
public health officials to upgrade state and local public health departments’ 
preparedness and response capabilities. In addition, CDC has worked with 
DOJ to complete a public health assessment tool, which is being used to 
determine the ability of state and local public health agencies to respond to 
biological and chemical agents, as well as other public health emergencies.
States have received funding from CDC to increase staff, provide better 
access to data sources, enhance capacity to detect the release of a 
biological agent or an emerging infectious disease, and improve Page 51 GAO-01-915 Bioterrorism:  Federal Research and Preparedness Activities
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$7.8 million was awarded to 41 state and local health agencies to improve 
the state and local public health agencies’ ability to link different sources of 
data, such as sales of certain pharmaceuticals, which could be helpful in 
detecting a covert bioterrorist event. 
Rapid identification and confirmatory diagnosis of biological agents are 
critical to ensuring that prevention and treatment measures can be 
implemented quickly. CDC was allocated $13 million in fiscal year 1999 to 
enhance state and local laboratory capacity. CDC has established a 
Laboratory Response Network that maintains state-of-the-art capabilities 
for biological agent identification and characterization. CDC has provided 
technical assistance and training in identification techniques to state and 
local public health laboratories. In addition, five state health departments 
received awards totaling $3 million in fiscal year 2000 to enhance chemical 
laboratory capabilities. These funds were used to purchase equipment and 
provide training. 
CDC is working with state and local health agencies to build a modern 
electronic infrastructure for public health communications that will 
improve the collection and transmission of information related to a 
bioterrorism incident as well as other events. For example, $21 million was 
awarded to states in fiscal year 1999 to begin implementation of the Health 
Alert Network, which will support the exchange of key information over 
the Internet and provide a foundation for distance training that could 
potentially reach a large segment of the public health community.
Upgrading CDC Capacity CDC is upgrading its own epidemiologic and disease surveillance capacity.  
It has deployed, and is continuing to develop, a surveillance system to 
increase surveillance and epidemiological capacities before, during, and 
after special events (such as the 1999 World Trade Organization meeting in 
Seattle, Washington). The agency is also increasing its veterinary 
surveillance. In addition, CDC monitors unusual clusters of illnesses, such 
as influenza in June. While these clusters may not be a cause for concern, 
they can indicate a potential problem.
CDC has strengthened its own laboratory capacity. For example, it is 
developing and validating diagnostic tests as well as creating agent-specific 
protocols. In collaboration with the Association of Public Health 
Laboratories and DOD, CDC has operationalized a secure Internet-based 
network that allows state, local, and other public health laboratories access 
to guidelines for analyzing biological agents. The site also allows Page 52 GAO-01-915 Bioterrorism:  Federal Research and Preparedness Activities
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laboratory analysis of samples.
The agency has also operationalized a Rapid Response and Advance 
Technology Laboratory, which screens samples for the presence of 
suspicious biological agents and evaluates new technology and protocols 
for the detection of biological agents. These technology assessments and 
protocols, as well as reagents and reference samples, are being shared with 
state and local public health laboratories.
Preparedness and Response 
Planning
In fiscal year 1999, at the start of CDC’s bioterrorism program, the agency 
received funding to develop an overall preparedness plan. CDC received 
$2.3 million in fiscal year 2000 for preparedness and response training and 
$9.2 million in fiscal year 2001.  Among the activities to be undertaken is the 
initial implementation of a national bioterrorism response training plan. 
This plan will focus on preparing CDC officials to respond to bioterrorism 
and will include the development of exercises to assess progress in 
achieving bioterrorism preparedness at the federal, state, and local levels. 
The agency will also develop a crisis communications/media response 
curriculum for bioterrorism as well as core capabilities guidelines to assist 
states and localities in their efforts to build comprehensive anti-
bioterrorism programs.
CDC has developed a bioterrorism Web site. This site provides emergency 
contact information for possible bioterrorism events, a list of critical 
agents, summaries of state and local bioterrorism projects, general 
information about CDC’s bioterrorism initiative, and links to documents on 
bioterrorism preparedness and response.
Building the National 
Pharmaceutical Stockpile 
Program
The National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program maintains a repository of 
life-saving pharmaceuticals, antidotes, and medical supplies, known as 12-
Hour Push Packages, that can be delivered to the site of a biological (or 
other) attack within 12 hours of deployment for the treatment of civilians. 
These Push Packages are prepackaged and contain products that could be 
used in a variety of scenarios.1 Additional antibiotics, antidotes, other 
drugs, medical equipment, and supplies known as Vendor Managed 
Inventory, can be delivered within 24 to 36 hours after the appropriate 
1The first emergency use of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile occurred on September 
11, 2001. In response to the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, CDC released one of 
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individual incident (that is, only products needed for a particular incident 
would be sent). The program received $51.0 million in fiscal year 1999, 
$51.8 million in fiscal year 2000, and $51.0 million in fiscal year 2001. CDC 
and OEP have encouraged state and local representatives to consider 
stockpile assets in their emergency planning for a biological attack and 
have trained representatives from state and local authorities in using the 
stockpile. The program also provides technical advisers in response to an 
event to ensure the appropriate and timely transfer of stockpile contents to 
authorized state representatives.2 
Food and Drug 
Administration
FDA’s responsibilities and activities on bioterrorism are spread throughout 
the agency. These activities include safeguarding the food supply, ensuring 
that new vaccines and drugs are safe and effective, and conducting 
research for diagnostic tools and treatment of disease outbreaks. 
Under the Health and Medical Services Annex of the Federal Response 
Plan, FDA is the lead HHS agency for ensuring the safety of regulated 
foods, drugs, medical devices, and biological products. In an emergency, 
FDA would arrange for the seizure, removal, and/or destruction of any 
contaminated and unsafe products. FDA is revising its Emergency 
Operations Response Plan to include bioterrorism preparedness and 
response elements.
Congress has earmarked $5 million for FDA for activities on bioterrorism in 
fiscal year 2001. These funds were for FDA to continue previously initiated 
work on bioterrorism that had been supported by departmental and general 
purpose funds. HHS has allocated other funds to FDA’s activities on 
bioterrorism. For example, the Center for Biologics Evaluation and 
Research received $7.5 million in fiscal year 2000 from departmental funds 
specifically for vaccine projects (see table 8). 
2For more information on the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program, see Combating 
Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs Further Improvement (GAO-01-
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Note: We have not audited or otherwise verified the information provided.
aAgency officials told us that in fiscal year 1998 funds were expended on bioterrorism-related activities, 
but they did not report these levels to us.
bWe were unable to allocate funding within this program for research and preparedness based on the 
information provided by FDA. Instead, we list all the funding under research because the 










Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research
   Research activities
      Premarket evaluation of vaccines,
      develop vaccines
a $1.2 $7.5 $7.0
Center for Devices and Radiological Health
   Research activities
Develop data requirements for approving devices intended to 
detect exposure to or infection with biological agents
a $0.1 $0.8 $0.9
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
   Research activities
Determine procedures for allowing use of not-yet-approved 
drugs, specify data needed for approval and labeling, gather 
and supply information
a $0.2 $0.4 $0.7
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition
   Preparedness activities
Monitor food supply, communicate with state and local officials a 0 0 $0.3
Center for Veterinary Medicine
Preparedness activities
Communicate with state officials, held meeting on bioterrorism 
risk
a $0.1 $0.1 $0.3
National Center for Toxicological Research
Research activities
Define biological mechanisms of action underlying toxicity of 
products, identify indications of toxicity associated with 
biological agents
a $0.2 $0.1 $0.5
   Preparedness activities
Participate in training meetings a b b b
Office of Regulatory Affairs
   Preparedness activities
Communicate with other agencies and the public, conduct 
investigations
c c c $1.5
Totald a $1.9 $9.0 $11.2Page 55 GAO-01-915 Bioterrorism:  Federal Research and Preparedness Activities
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did not specify how much was spent on them.
dIndividual entries may not sum to totals because of rounding.
Source: FDA.
Center for Biologics 
Evaluation and Research
The mission of the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research is to 
ensure the safety, efficacy, potency, and purity of biological and related 
products, including vaccines, that could be used in case of a bioterrorist 
attack.
Research Activities Among its responsibilities, the Center for Biologics Evaluation and 
Research regulates the development and licensure of new vaccines for 
anthrax, smallpox, and the associated vaccinia immune globulin used to 
treat serious vaccinia infections or other adverse events caused by the 
smallpox vaccine. In addition to premarketing evaluation, vaccine products 
require review of lot release data, inspection of manufacturing facilities, 
assessment of product availability, and surveillance and compliance 
activities. The center works closely with other government agencies such 
as CDC and DOD to assist in ensuring that sufficient quantities of medical 
products are available for military and civilian use during a bioterrorism 
attack, and that the use is controlled under an acceptable clinical protocol 
when the biological product is not licensed by FDA or is being used “off 
label.”3 It also coordinates with industry and government agencies to 
prepare surveillance methods for adverse event monitoring associated with 
the use of biological products in a bioterrorism attack. The center engages 
in vaccine research activities related to the regulation of the development 
of vaccines for plague, tularemia, and encephalitis-causing viruses.4 (See 
app. I for a discussion of specific biological agents mentioned in this 
report.)
Since high-risk bioterrorism pathogens either do not exist naturally or do 
not cause significant disease in large populations, the traditional human 
testing and ultimate approval of products for mitigating a disease in 
humans caused by a bioterrorist pathogen is neither ethical nor feasible. 
The center is working with CDC, NIH, and DOD, as well as academia and 
3“Off label” refers to the treatment of conditions other than those listed on FDA’s approved 
drug label.
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research data required to demonstrate the potential efficacy of new 
products on humans affected by biological WMDs.
Officials have noted that while there is a clear need to develop vaccines for 
biological agents, there are limited commercial interests or market 
incentives for addressing the problem. Consequently, it falls upon the 
federal government to develop such vaccines. The Center for Biologics 
Evaluation and Research has research projects under way dealing with 
vaccines for anthrax, plague, and smallpox.
Center for Devices and 
Radiological Health
The mission of the Center for Devices and Radiological Health is to ensure 
the safety and effectiveness of medical devices, including those that could 
be used in the event of a bioterrorist attack.
Research Activities The center provided comments on a research protocol to evaluate a device 
intended to identify anthrax in human specimens. It has also conducted an 
advisory panel meeting to discuss data requirements for approval of 
devices intended to detect exposure to or infection with biological agents. 
In addition, the center is working with CDC on a process that would allow 
the use of investigational diagnostic devices in the event of a bioterrorist 
attack.
Center for Drug Evaluation 
and Research
The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research helps ensure the availability 
of safe and effective human drugs. The center reviews research to take 
appropriate action on the marketing of drugs, including those that would 
be used in the event of a bioterrorist attack. 
Research Activities The center is working with CDC on a process that would satisfy the 
requirements for allowing the use of investigational drugs (not approved by 
FDA) in the event of a bioterrorist attack. Testing drugs that might be used 
in case of a bioterrorist attack is difficult because the diseases caused by 
the biological agents rarely occur naturally and it would be unethical to 
infect healthy volunteers with the disease when there is no known cure. 
The center is working with other government agencies and the 
manufacturers of these drugs to determine what studies are needed to 
generate sufficient safety and efficacy data to permit labeling of these 
drugs. For products that might still be in the investigational stage, but 
potentially the only therapies available for a specific disease caused by a Page 57 GAO-01-915 Bioterrorism:  Federal Research and Preparedness Activities
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methods of data collection and analysis to evaluate the products’ safety and 
efficacy if it were necessary for them to be used.
Although some drugs that would be used in the case of a bioterrorist attack 
have been approved to treat diseases caused by a biological agent, use of a 
number of these drugs would be “off-label.” The center is determining what 
data are needed to enable approval of a label indicating that a drug would 
treat a disease that might be caused by a bioterrorist attack. It has a 
program in this area, but there has been limited funding for these activities. 
The center has worked to facilitate the labeling of ciproflaxacin for the 
treatment of inhalational anthrax and is now working to assess what is 
needed in the way of studies to produce sufficient data for labeling 
gentamicin to treat pneumonic plague. It is also determining what types of 
nonclinical (nonhuman) data are acceptable for product marketing 
approval if traditional clinical studies are not feasible or ethical.
At the request of the National Security Council, the center has compiled a 
list of and information on drugs that might be effective in case of a 
bioterrorist attack. The information includes manufacturers, inventories, 
lead time for producing the drugs, and bulk suppliers. Center officials 
noted that they do not regularly collect this information. It is also working 
with CDC to implement a shelf-life extension program for the maintenance 
of stockpiled supplies.
Center for Food Safety and 
Applied Nutrition
The Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition is responsible for 
promoting and protecting the public’s health by ensuring that the nation’s 
food supply is safe, sanitary, wholesome, and appropriately labeled. The 
center has been involved in preparing for a bioterrorist attack on the food 
supply.
Preparedness Activities The Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition has undertaken activities 
regarding contaminated food that are important for bioterrorism response 
readiness. For example, the agency has developed a procedures manual for 
dealing with foodborne attacks. The center works with other federal and 
state agencies to monitor the safety of the U.S. food supply. The agency has 
been involved in the development and support of two surveillance systems 
for identifying and characterizing contaminated food, FoodNet and 
PulseNet. FoodNet is a collaborative project of FDA, CDC, USDA, and nine 
state health departments. It is an effort to capture a more accurate and 
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with specific infections that are likely to be foodborne. PulseNet is a 
collaborative project of FDA, CDC, USDA, and state health department 
food safety laboratories to facilitate subtyping bacterial foodborne 
pathogens for epidemiological purposes.
The center (along with the Office of Regulatory Affairs) is leading an effort 
to improve coordination and communication among federal, state, and 
local public health and food regulatory officials. The efforts are targeted at 
outbreaks of illness caused by foodborne pathogens and are meant to 
contribute to more effective implementation of existing food safety 
programs.
Center for Veterinary 
Medicine
The Center for Veterinary Medicine regulates the manufacture and 
distribution of food additives and drugs that will be given to animals. These 
include animals from which human foods are derived as well as food 
additives and drugs for pet (or companion) animals. Since animals raised 
for food are a potential target for a bioterrorist attack, the center has 
initiated activities to increase its preparedness.
Preparedness Activities The Center for Veterinary Medicine has established and maintains lines of 
communication with state regulatory officials and personnel in state 
veterinary diagnostic laboratories. The center co-sponsored a meeting to 
review the risks to U.S. and world food and agriculture from plant and 
animal disease and bioterrorism.
National Center for 
Toxicological Research
The National Center for Toxicological Research conducts scientific 
research that supports and anticipates FDA’s current and future regulatory 
needs. This involves fundamental and applied research on biological 
mechanisms of action underlying the toxicity of products regulated by 
FDA.
Research Activities The National Center for Toxicological Research has examined proteins in 
food to determine the existence of bacteria. It has also worked on 
approaches to identify indications of toxicity associated with biological 
agents. 
Preparedness Activities In the event of an attack, the center has the ability to respond with animal 
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participate in meetings with FEMA and Arkansas public health officials to 
plan training activities for responding to bioterrorism threats.
Office of Regulatory Affairs Among its responsibilities, the Office of Regulatory Affairs responds to 
emergencies involving products regulated by FDA. If a bioterrorist event 
were to take place, the office would be involved in the investigation. 
Preparedness Activities FDA would be involved in the management of a response to any attack that 
targets a FDA-regulated product. The Office of Regulatory Affairs’ Office of 
Criminal Investigations would conduct the criminal investigation and serve 
as the liaison to the FBI and other law enforcement agencies.
The Office of Regulatory Affairs maintains a 24-hour emergency hotline, in 
part for receiving information about a bioterrorist attack. It has also 
established a notification system with the FBI for bioterrorist events.
National Institutes of 
Health
NIH conducts medical research in its own laboratories and supports the 
research of nonfederal scientists in universities, medical schools, hospitals, 
and research institutions throughout the United States and abroad. NIH is 
composed of 27 separate institutes and centers. One of these is the 
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), which has a 
program to support research related to organisms likely to be used as 
biological weapons. This program includes research devoted to the 
development of (1) rapid, accurate diagnostics, (2) effective therapy for 
those infected, and (3) vaccines for those at risk of exposure.
All of NIH’s research on bioterrorism has been funded out of general 
appropriations. Table 9 gives the amounts of reported funding for NIH’s 
activities on bioterrorism for fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2001.Page 60 GAO-01-915 Bioterrorism:  Federal Research and Preparedness Activities
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Note: We have not audited or otherwise verified the information provided.
aIndividual entries may not sum to totals because of rounding.
Source: NIH.
Research Activities The initial focus of NIAID’s research efforts on bioterrorism was on 
smallpox and anthrax. The agency collaboratively funded (along with DOD, 
DOE, and CDC) activities on smallpox, including research to develop and 
test antiviral drugs against smallpox viruses, extend the usefulness of the 
currently available, older vaccine, and to develop a vaccine that can be 
used in all segments of the civilian population (for instance, pregnant 
women and the immune-suppressed). For anthrax, NIAID has formed the 
Working Group on Anthrax Vaccines to develop and test a new vaccine that 
could be used to replace the currently licensed vaccine.
In addition to these ongoing activities, NIAID provided support to sequence 
the genomes of all bacterial pathogens considered by CDC to have the 
potential to be used as bioterrorism agents. The results of such research, 
along with other information, are expected to facilitate pursuit of a variety 
of critical goals, including the development of rapid diagnostic methods, 
antimicrobial therapies, and new vaccines for the most likely bioterrorist 
agents.
NIAID also conducts and sponsors research in the areas of diagnostics, 
therapeutics, and vaccines, as well as basic research on the origination and 
development of diseases from biological agents. In diagnostics research, 
the development of detection systems for smallpox antigens has been 
emphasized. Therapeutics research has covered a number of areas 
including the development of a replacement therapy for treating the serious 











Diagnostics $0.3 $1.3 $0.9 $1.1
Vaccines $3.0 $6.6 $6.8 $7.0
Antibiotics/antivirals $0.4 $3.3 $5.6 $6.1
Basic research (genomics and pathogenesis) $13.2 $21.4 $29.7 $35.4
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anthrax to prevent illness resulting from a terrorist attack. The agency has 
collaborated with the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 
Diseases on the development of a new anthrax vaccine to protect the 
American public. NIAID is also conducting basic research in a number of 
areas, including the genetic basis for the virulence of potential bioterrorist 
agents.
Office of Emergency 
Preparedness
OEP coordinates the medical and public health response to emergencies, 
including all kinds of terrorist attacks and natural disasters. OEP has taken 
an “all-hazards” approach to emergency preparedness and response 
because it is involved in the health response to many different types of 
situations, including bioterrorism. See table 10 for OEP’s reported funding 
for activities on terrorism.













$0.1 $0.1 0 0
Smallpox study $0.1 0 0 0
Special activities 0 0 0 $4.6
Preparedness activities
   Combating terrorism $0.3 $19.0 $20.0 $27.2
National Medical Response Teams 0 $1.5 $1.5 $1.5
U.S. Public Health Service Noble Training Center 0 $3.0 $1.0 $2.9
VA WMD training 0 0 0 $0.8
Pharmaceutical Cache 0 0 $1.0 $1.2
Metropolitan Medical Response
System
0 $14.5 $16.5 $17.4
Special events 0 0 0 $2.0
Surveillance and laboratory support $0.3a 0 0 0
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aThis money was transferred to CDC, FDA, and HHS’ Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry. This funding stopped once these agencies began receiving bioterrorism funding.
bIndividual entries may not sum to totals because of rounding.
Source: OEP.
Research Activities OEP has participated in research and evaluation activities. It has worked 
with the Institute of Medicine to develop an assessment methodology and 
performance measures for the Metropolitan Medical Response System. 
OEP also oversees $4.6 million in fiscal year 2001 for research special 
activities, which are earmarks in the budget for specific universities, 
hospitals, or response systems to conduct studies (see table 10).
Preparedness Activities HHS coordinates many of its medical response activities with other 
agencies through the National Disaster Medical System. OEP leads this 
system, a partnership among HHS, DOD, VA, FEMA, state and local 
governments, and the private sector, which is intended to ensure that 
resources are available to provide medical services following a disaster 
that overwhelms the local health care resources. The overall purpose of the 
system is to establish a single, integrated national medical response 
capability to (1) assist state and local authorities in dealing with the 
medical and health effects of major peacetime disasters and (2) provide 
support to the military and VA medical systems in caring for casualties 
evacuated to the United States from overseas armed conflicts. About 2,000 
civilian hospitals have pledged resources that could be marshaled in any 
domestic emergency under the system.
In addition to providing additional capacity in the event of an emergency, 
the National Disaster Medical System also has response teams that can 
Infrastructure $9.7 $12.6 $15.3 $18.9
Office/regions $5.0 $7.5 $8.8 $12.3
Planning and evaluation $1.2 $1.0 $1.0 $1.0
Training and exercises 0 $0.8 $2.5 $2.5
Disaster Medical Assistance Team development $2.5 $2.5 $2.5 $2.6
Communications $1.0 $0.8 $0.5 $0.5
Totalb $10.2 $31.7 $35.3 $50.7
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can deploy to disaster sites with sufficient supplies and equipment to 
sustain themselves for 72 hours while providing medical care at a fixed or 
temporary site.5 In mass casualty events, the teams would perform triage, 
provide medical care, and prepare patients for evacuation. In other types of 
situations, the teams may also provide primary health care and/or serve to 
augment overloaded local health care staffs. 
There are also specialized Disaster Medical Assistance Teams. Some of the 
specialized teams deal with specific medical conditions, such as burns or 
mental health. Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams provide 
mortuary services and victim identification. There are four National 
Medical Response Teams located around the country that are specially 
equipped and trained to provide medical care for victims of WMDs. Three 
of these are deployable anywhere in the country, and all four teams have a 
stockpile of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies to treat up to 5,000 
people. However, these stockpiles are primarily for treating victims of a 
chemical weapon.
OEP received $2 million in fiscal year 2001 that was transferred to VA to 
provide funding for VA to manage caches of pharmaceuticals for the 
National Medical Response Teams and for training of National Disaster 
Medical System hospitals in response to WMD events. OEP also received 
approximately $2.9 million in fiscal year 2001 to provide management staff 
and operating funds for the U.S. Public Health Service Noble Training 
Center in Alabama. This center is developing curricula and providing 
training activities for physicians, nurses, and emergency medical 
technicians. This facility will primarily provide training in response to a 
chemical incident, but will also have some bioterrorism response duties.
The office received $2.6 million in fiscal year 2001 for Disaster Medical 
Assistance Team development, which funds training programs for the 
teams and other specialty teams (see table 10 for detailed budget 
information). OEP received an additional $1.5 million to expand the 
National Medical Response Teams, primarily by providing additional team 
members and purchasing equipment. Some funding from both of these 
5Disaster Medical Assistance Teams were dispatched to the New York City and Washington, 
D.C., areas on September 11, 2001. The initial units included more than 300 medical and 
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National Disaster Medical System conference. 
OEP was allocated received $2.5 million in fiscal year 2001 to provide 
additional training and exercise activities for Disaster Medical Assistance 
Teams and local responders to ensure that teams are operational in a field 
setting, and that the community and response teams can work together to 
achieve an integrated approach to medical care during a terrorist event. 
These funds also provide for coordinated training and exercises with other 
departments, such as DOD and DOE, during response to special events.
The office also deploys teams from the National Disaster Medical System to 
high-security events, such as visits by heads of state. In fiscal year 2001, 
OEP received $2 million to support the costs of deploying teams to a 
number of special events, including $1 million for the Olympic games and 
$1 million for other special events, such as the presidential inauguration. 
OEP’s Metropolitan Medical Response System emphasizes enhancement of 
local planning and response capability, tailored to each jurisdiction, to care 
for victims of a terrorist incident involving WMDs. The program includes a 
focus on response to bioterrorism, including disease surveillance, mass 
casualty care, and mass fatality management. OEP, under the Metropolitan 
Medical Response System, has entered into contracts with 97 local areas to 
develop and coordinate local medical response capabilities. This program 
works at the local level because of the rapid response time that would be 
required to manage the consequences of a terrorist attack. OEP received 
approximately $17 million in fiscal year 2001 to expand the program to 25 
additional communities and continue development in 25 existing areas 
begun in fiscal year 2000. In addition, 47 of the areas received additional 
funding to plan for an appropriate health system response to a bioterrorist 
attack. Planning and evaluation funds were used, in part, to provide 
oversight and technical assistance for response system activities. In fiscal 
year 2001, OEP is overseeing $1.4 million that was earmarked in the budget 
for the Charlotte, North Carolina, Metropolitan Medical Response System. 
The funds will be used to coordinate and enhance preparedness of 
community health care facilities, for provider training, and to integrate the 
public health system into a mass casualty response system.
OEP received approximately $12 million in fiscal year 2001 for general 
emergency preparedness infrastructure development and maintenance. 
This includes headquarters and regional staff salaries, rent, and other Page 65 GAO-01-915 Bioterrorism:  Federal Research and Preparedness Activities
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GENERAL
http://www.stimson.org/cwc/terror$.htm
Henry L. Stimson Center, Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project, What Is the
U.S. Government Spending to Combat Terrorism?
http://stimson.org/cwc/ataxia.htm
Henry L. Stimson Center, Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project, Report #35:
Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the U.S. Response
http://www.homelanddefense.org/journal/Commentary/commentary.cfm?commentary=3
Al Mauroni, “A Rebuttal to ‘Ataxia,’ the Smithson Report on U.S. Response to CB Terrorism,”
ANSER Institute for Homeland Security
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/library.cfm?cat_format=1&category1_id=17










Johns Hopkins University, Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies: Library
http://www.tacda.org/jcd/
American Civil Defense Association, Journal of Civil Defense
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR505/
Kevin Jack Riley and Bruce Hoffman, Domestic Terrorism: A National Assessment of State and
Local Preparedness, RAND’s Criminal Justice Research Program
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http://www.cbaci.org/CDCSectionLinksMain.htm







Monterey Institute of International Studies Homepage
http://www.slu.edu/colleges/sph/bioterrorism/
St. Louis University School of Public Health, Center for the Study of Bioterrorism and Emerging
Infections
http://www.mipt.org/p-cmi.html
Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism,
“Preparedness/Consequence Management Information”
http://www.mipt.org/infrastructure.html
Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, “Infrastructure
Protection/Computer Security”
http://www.mipt.org/ttclinks.html
Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, “Think Tanks and
Centers”
http://www.asmusa.org/pasrc/bioterrorismdef.htm
American Society for Microbiology, Public Policy, Bioterrorism: Frontline Response, Evaluating
U.S. Preparedness
http://www.asmusa.org/pcsrc/bioprep.htm
American Society for Microbiology, Communications, ASM Resources Related to Biological
Weapons Control and Bioterrorism Preparedness
http://faculty.virginia.edu/ciag/bioterr.html
Critical Incident Analysis Group, “Public Responsibilities and Mass Destruction: The Bioterrorism
Threat”
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
http://www.os.dhhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/01fsbioterrorism.html
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Fact Sheet, HHS Initiative Prepares for
Possible Bioterrorism Threat, August 16, 2001
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http://www.oep-ndms.dhhs.gov/CT_Program/Response_Planning/response_planning.html
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Counter 
Terrorism Program, “Response Planning”
http://www.mmrs.hhs.gov/
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Emergency Preparedness,
“Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS)”
http://www.fda.gov/cber/cntrbio/cntrbio.htm
Food and Drug Administration, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, “Countering
Bioterrorism Initiative”
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/biologicalandchemicalweapons.html
National Institutes of Health, National Library of Medicine, MEDLINE Plus Information Service,
“Biological and Chemical Weapons”
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/RegionalMeetings/2001/2001RMSummary.asp
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response,
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program Core Capacity Project 2001
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/learningresources.asp
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response,
Resources
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response,
Homepage
http://www.emforum.org/vlibrary/010214.htm
Kim McCoy, M.P.H., Public Health Preparedness for Bioterrorism, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program, Virtual Library Presentation,
2/14/01
http://www.phppo.cdc.gov/han/
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Practice Program Office, Health Alert
Network, Homepage
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry, Homepage
http://www.os.dhhs.gov/news/speech/2001/010710.html
Tommy Thompson, Facing the Threat of Bioterrorism: Plans and Priorities in the Bush
Administration, Remarks to the National Governors Association National Policy Summit on




U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Medical Reference Site
http://www.usamriid.army.mil/
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Homepage
http://www.fema.gov/library/terrorf.htm
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Library, “Fact Sheet: Terrorism”
http://www.dola.state.co.us/oem/Terrorism/Reference%20Material/fema%20terrorism%20&
%20response.htm
U.S. Department of Labor, “FEMA’s Role in Terrorism Preparedness and Response”
http://www.fema.gov/library/allhzpln6g.htm
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Library, Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations
Planning, Chapter 6, Attachment G – Terrorism
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/terrorism/funding.htm
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, “Terrorism and Domestic Preparedness:
Funding”
http://www.epa.gov/ceppo/




Michael R. Fraser, Ph.D., and V. Scott Fisher, M.P.H., Elements of Effective Bioterrorism
Preparedness: A Planning Primer for Local Public Health Agencies, National Association of
County and City Health Officials
http://www.naccho.org/search2.cfm?publication=LINK&topicID=2&numresults=all&showa
bstract=yes&startrow=1
National Association of County and City Health Officials, “Biological/Chemical Terrorism Related
Links”
http://www.astho.org/phiip/index.html
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, Public Health Information and Infrastructure
Policy Committee
http://www.cste.org
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, Homepage
http://www.chems.alaska.gov/bioterrorism_links_detection_identification.htm
Alaska Community Health and Emergency Medical Services, Injury Surveillance and
Prevention Program, “Bioterrorism Links: Detection and Identification”
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http://www.oes.ca.gov/
State of California, “Governor’s Office of Emergency Services”
http://www.dhs.cahwnet.gov/ps/dcdc/bt/
California Department of Health Services, “Bioterrorism Surveillance and Epidemiology Team”
http://www.ci.long-beach.ca.us/disaster/index.htm
City of Long Beach, California, “Disaster Information Resources”
http://www.ci.long-beach.ca.us/fire/our%5Ffamily/ss/disastermanagement.htm
City of Long Beach, California, Fire Department, Support Services, “Disaster Management
Division”
http://www.ph.dhr.state.ga.us/programs/emerprep/index.shtml
Georgia Division of Public Health, “Emergency Preparedness Program”
http://www.kdhe.state.ks.us/han/bioterror.html
Kansas Department of Health and Environment, Kansas Health Alert Network, “Bioterrorism
Response, Preparedness, and FAQ Sheets”
http://www.state.ma.us/mema/index.htm
Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency, Homepage
http://www.dps.state.mn.us/emermgt/
Minnesota Department of Public Safety, “Division of Emergency Management”
http://epi.health.state.nm.us/han/default.asp
New Mexico Department of Health, Health Alert Network, “Bioterrorism Planning and
Preparedness”
http://www.nysemo.state.ny.us/
New York State Emergency Management Office, Homepage
http://www.ohd.hr.state.or.us/acd/bioterr/home.htm
Oregon Department of Human Services, Oregon Health Division, Center for Disease Prevention
and Epidemiology, Acute and Communicable Disease Program, “Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response”
http://www.healthri.org/environment/biot/home.htm
Rhode Island Department of Health, Environmental Health, “Bioterrorism Preparedness Program”
http://www.state.sd.us/doh/Lab/bio2.htm
South Dakota Department of Health, State Public Health Laboratory, “Bioterrorism Preparedness
in South Dakota”
http://www.state.tn.us/health/CEDS/bioterrorism.htm




Texas Department of Health, “Bioterrorism”
http://wdhfs.state.wy.us/ahrp/bioterrorism%20preparedness.htm
Wyoming Department of Health, All Hazards Response Program, “Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response in Wyoming” 
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
http://www.apha.org/united/
American Public Health Association, “The Public Health Community Responds to the Tragedy of
September 11, 2001"
http://www.aphl.org
Association of Public Health Laboratories, Homepage
http://www.aha.org/Emergency/EmIndex.asp
American Hospital Association, “Disaster Readiness 2001: America Must Be Prepared “
http://www.jcaho.org/standard/ecer.html
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, Standard Revisions for 2001,
“Emergency Management”
http://www.idsociety.org/
Infectious Diseases Society of America, Homepage
http://www.ashp.org/public/proad/emergency/em_prep.html
American Society of Health-Systems Pharmacists, “Emergency Preparedness—Counterterrorism
Resource Center”
http://www.acponline.org/bioterro/biblio.htm
American College of Physicians–American Society of Internal Medicine, “Bioterrorism
Bibliography”
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr4904a1.htm
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan
for Preparedness and Response, Recommendations of the CDC Strategic Planning Workgroup,
April 21, 2000
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/5345.html
Scott Deitchman, M.D., M.P.H., Bioterrorism Planning in Medical School Curriculum, American
Medical Association
http://www.acep.org/2,1155,0.html
American College of Emergency Physicians, “Terrorism Preparedness: Medical First Response”
